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Article 
Strange Traffic:  Sex, Slavery, and the Freedom 
Principle 
ANDERS WALKER 
This Article uses the recent prosecution of a sex trafficking case 
in rural Missouri to argue three points.  First, the federal law of 
trafficking is currently being used in unanticipated ways, including 
the apprehension of individuals who pay for sex.  Second, trafficking 
invites creative use precisely because it provides prosecutors with a 
more salient justification for punishment than either legal moralism 
or harm; a rhetorical plea to anti-slavery that enjoys a longstanding 
but under-theorized role in criminal law rhetoric.  Third, anti-
slavery’s recurrence in criminal law rhetoric illustrates a larger 
doctrinal point, namely that mid-century reformers like H. L. A. Hart 
truncated John Stuart Mill to reduce the criminal sanction, ignoring 
Mill’s subordination of harm to a larger, more intrusive “principle 
of freedom.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 563 
II.  “EXTREME TYPES OF PLAY” ................................................ 568 
III.  THE RHETORIC OF SLAVERY .............................................. 578 
IV.  THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM............................................. 588 
V.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 598 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Strange Traffic:  Sex, Slavery, and the Freedom 
Principle 
ANDERS WALKER* 
“The principle of freedom cannot require that [one] should be free 
not to be free.”1 
—John Stuart Mill 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 27, 2009, paramedics in Lebanon, Missouri responded to 
a call from an isolated trailer on a wooded hill, arriving to find a middle-
aged man named Ed Bagley administering CPR to a twenty-four year old 
woman.2  According to Bagley, the woman—whom he referred to simply 
as Nicole—had collapsed on the floor of their trailer just prior to leaving 
for work.3  According to Nicole, who was later revived in a Springfield 
hospital, Bagley had alternately shocked and suffocated her in a fit of 
violent abuse, causing her to suffer cardiac arrest.4  The near-death 
experience, Nicole later told federal authorities, marked the culmination of 
a brutal relationship involving torture, terror, and confinement.5  
Aghast, federal prosecutor Cynthia Cordes ordered agents to the trailer, 
where they discovered a strange, white-walled room filled with chains, 
handcuffs, piercing items, whips, and other sexual devices.6  Upon further 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Yale University, Ph.D. 2003; Duke 
University, J.D. 1998; Wesleyan University, B.A. 1994.  I would like to thank Bernard Harcourt, Laura 
Weinrib, Aziz Huq, R.H. Helmholz, Daniel Abebe, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Workshop at 
the University of Chicago Law School, along with Bernadette Meyler, Annelise Riles, Josh Chafetz, 
Aziz Rana, and the Law and Humanities Colloquium at Cornell Law School for comments and 
criticism.  I would also like to thank Laura Appleman, Norman Williams, David Friedman, Peter 
Letsou, and the faculty workshop series at Willamette University College of Law for comments on this 
piece, as well as Molly Walker Wilson, Monica Eppinger, Marcia McCormick, and the students in my 
Regulation of Vice Seminar at Saint Louis University School of Law.  Research credit goes to Nicholas 
Burkhart, F. Phillip Peche, and Abby Duncan. 
1 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 101 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978) 
(1859). 
2 Todd C. Frankel, Torture or Kinky Sex? Opinion Split, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 
2010, at A1. 
3 Nicole’s last name was never revealed.  Instead, the government referred to her simply as 
Female Victim or “FV” in its indictment.  Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Bagley, 
No. 10-00244-01/02/04/06-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011). 
4 Frankel, supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. (describing the scene discovered by FBI investigators). 
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questioning, Nicole revealed that Bagley had lured her into the trailer in 
2002 with promises of a “great life,” meanwhile subjecting her to a pattern 
of sadistic violence that spanned almost seven years and took the couple 
from Missouri to Los Angeles for a pornographic photo shoot later sold to 
Taboo magazine.7  Convinced that she had stumbled across a case of 
modern slavery, Cordes charged Bagley with eighteen federal offenses, 
including sex trafficking and violation of the Mann Act.8 
This last allegation proved curious.  Enacted in 1910, the Mann Act 
emerged amidst a moral panic over white slavery that historians now 
believe was exaggerated to facilitate a series of ulterior policy agendas, 
including the regulation of immigrants and prostitutes.9  Recently, scholars 
have begun to wonder whether similarly hidden motives might lie behind 
federal trafficking prosecutions.10  To take just a few examples, sociologist 
Gretchen Soderlund has demonstrated that federal interest in trafficking 
derives in part from its utility as a tool of foreign policy, both as a 
rhetorical cover for legitimating American intervention abroad and as a 
device for directing United States Agency for International Development 
funds to nations that comply with various American directives on sex 
education, contraceptives, and prostitution.11  Meanwhile, domestic 
reformers have embraced the rhetoric of trafficking to mount a larger, 
veiled struggle against immigration, prostitution, and challenges to 
                                                                                                                          
7 Id. 
8 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 1–4.  
9 See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International 
Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 513 (1990) (describing white slavery as “the entire system of licensed 
prostitution in existence throughout much of Europe and parts of the United States”); see also DAVID J. 
LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT 38–41 (1994) 
(discussing the history of the drafting of the Mann Act); Dianne Otto, Lost in Translation: Re-Scripting 
the Sex Subjects of International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 318, 
324 (Anne Orford ed., 2006) (describing the trafficking of women for prostitution as the impetus of 
white slavery).  See generally Mary Ann Irwin, White Slavery as Metaphor: Anatomy of a Moral Panic, 
5 EX POST FACTO 1 (1996) (explaining how an English newspaper article on white slavery sparked 
controversy across the world). 
10 See Alicia W. Peters, “Things That Involve Sex Are Just Different”: US Anti-Trafficking Law 
and Policy on the Books, in Their Minds, and in Action, 86 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 235, 236 (2013) 
(acknowledging a trend “to conflate prostitution with trafficking”); Gretchen Soderlund, Running from 
the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition, 17 NWSA J. 
64, 77 (2005) (“This case suggests that the tools anti-trafficking laws put at the administration’s 
disposal can be used to further other geopolitical ends and are inseparable from the larger arena of 
international politics.”). 
11 Soderlund further contends that American interest in global sex trafficking spiked after 
evangelical groups embraced the rescue and rehabilitation of foreign prostitutes as a means of 
“proselytizing” them, even as President Bush invoked “nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anti-
prostitution rhetoric” to launch a “War Against Trafficking” that bolstered America’s “broader moral 
agenda” in the War on Terror.  Soderlund, supra note 10, at 77.  
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“traditional social values rooted in heterosexual . . . marriage.”12  
Popular media have contributed to these efforts by publicizing extreme 
cases, drawing dubious connections to antebellum slavery, and citing 
questionable data.13  For example, the New York Times Magazine ran a 
sensational story about domestic trafficking in 2004, alleging a “sex-
trafficking epidemic” in the United States that involved upwards of 
“30,000 to 50,000 sex slaves” held in “squalid,” secret “stash houses,” 
including one that evoked the “land-based equivalent of a 19th-century 
slave ship.”14  Almost immediately, critics questioned the veracity of the 
piece, citing a 2005 State Department report that boasted much lower 
numbers than the New York Times Magazine alleged.15  Similarly, a 2008 
study of teenage prostitutes conducted by sociologists Ric Curtis and Karen 
Terry revealed that most of the youth were independently and voluntarily 
prostituting to earn money, without fear of confinement or coercion.16  The 
study concluded that claims of trafficked teenage prostitutes survived 
precisely because reformers found it a useful frame for advancing ulterior 
agendas—including counter-prostitution and immigration control—much 
like the Mann Act in 1910.17  
                                                                                                                          
12 Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and 
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1665 (2010); see id. (discussing the link 
between trafficking and anti-prostitution efforts); Nicholas D. Kristof, What About American Girls Sold 
on the Streets?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at WK10 (demonstrating the prevalence of trafficking even 
in the United States).  One such agenda is the protection of illegal immigrants.  Academics have 
already begun to show how reclassifying undocumented immigrants as victims of trafficking enables 
them to stay in the United States and avoid deportation.  See, e.g., Britta S. Loftus, Coordinating U.S. 
Law on Immigration and Human Trafficking: Lifting the Lamp to Victims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 143, 146 (2011) (using a hypothetical to show that a police officer’s decision to arrest a foreign 
woman for prostitution or, alternatively, to suspect the same woman to be a victim of human 
trafficking, will impact whether the woman is deported or “protected”).  
13 See generally Nicholas D. Kristof, The Face of Modern Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at 
A31 (describing the author’s interview with a six-year-old Cambodian sex slave); Peter Landesman, 
The Girls Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (portraying the scene of a police 
raid in New Jersey that rescued four underage Mexican sex slaves); Benjamin Skinner, Modern-Day 
Slavery on D.C.’s Embassy Row?, TIME (June 14, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8
599,1996402,00.html (examining the case of a Tanzanian diplomat who forced a woman into slavery).   
14 Landesman, supra note 13, at 32.   
15 See Jack Shafer, Sex Slaves, Revisited, SLATE (June 7, 2005), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2005/06/sex_slaves_revisited.html (citing a 
2004 State Department report estimating that between 14,500 and 17,500 people were trafficked across 
U.S. borders for forced labor and sexual exploitation); Editors’ Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, § 1, at 
3 (responding to and addressing various critiques of Landesman’s article). 
16 1 RIC CURTIS ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY 57–58 (2008); see also Kristen Hinman, Lost Boys, 
VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.villagevoice.com/2011-11-02/news/lost-boys/ (reporting 
on the research approach and findings of sociologists Ric Curtis and Meredith Dank).  
17 See Hinman, supra note 16 (debunking the overwhelming media portrayal of child prostitution 
in the United States as one where the child is controlled by a pimp).  According to Gretchen Soderlund, 
evangelicals have played a particularly important role in the resurgence of trafficking, seizing “on the 
issue of sex slavery” to expressly “expand their base and political power.”  Soderlund, supra note 10, at 
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Ed Bagley’s initial prosecution for both the Mann Act violation and 
sex trafficking provides a rare opportunity to assess the evolving power of 
legal rhetoric over time, particularly the rhetoric of anti-slavery as a 
justification for intrusive, regulatory regimes.18  To demonstrate, even 
though Bagley’s Mann Act charge hinged on the claim that he transported 
Nicole across state lines against her will, considerable evidence exists to 
suggest otherwise.  For example, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch sent a 
reporter to Lebanon in 2010 only to find locals claiming that Nicole 
boasted publicly of their sexual exploits, all part of a consensual S&M 
lifestyle that she and Ed videotaped and posted on the Internet.19  One of 
Nicole’s co-workers told the Post-Dispatch that Nicole considered her trip 
to California a “blast,” a story corroborated by California-based 
photographer Ken Marcus who had invited Ed and Nicole to Los Angeles 
in 2007 for the supposedly criminal photo shoot.20  To Marcus, who 
became aware of the couple by viewing one of their “live shows” online, 
the pair seemed happy, Ed seemed doting, and Nicole appeared excited to 
be on the West Coast.21  That Ed had coerced Nicole to go on the trip 
struck Marcus as implausible, particularly since Nicole expressed an 
interest in professional modeling—an interest she herself corroborated 
during an interview with Taboo magazine in August 2007.22  
Nicole’s stated willingness to serve as a pornographic model in 
California raises questions about Ed Bagley’s trafficking and Mann Act 
charges, questions further exacerbated by the outcome of the case.  While 
four defendants who traveled to Lebanon and participated in S&M sessions 
with Nicole pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and one 
such defendant who also drove Ed and Nicole to California additionally 
pleaded guilty to violating the Mann Act, Ed evaded all trafficking and 
Mann Act charges and only pleaded guilty to the use of an interstate 
facility, i.e., the Internet, to facilitate sex with a minor.23  This last charge 
                                                                                                                          
68.  Finally, trafficking has proven a remarkably effective cover for the expansion of prosecutorial 
might.  Already, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Missouri has drawn 
considerable federal funds by making itself one of the foremost hubs of human trafficking prosecutions 
in the United States, even though it lies far from any international border or port.  See Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and Labor Announce Selection of Anti-
Trafficking Coordination Teams (July 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crt-963.html (announcing a plan to bring a team of federal 
prosecutors and federal agents to Kansas City, Missouri to combat human trafficking). 
18 Chuang, supra note 12, at 1659. 
19 Frankel, supra note 2. 
20 Id. 
21 Hunter Walker, FBI Questions Hustler Editor, Photographer in Sex Slave Case, WRAP (Sept. 
12, 2010), http://www.thewrap.com/media/column-post/alleged-sex-slave-appeared-hustler-
photoshoots-20766. 
22 Ernest Greene, Master Ed and Slave Nicole: Heartland Kink, TABOO, Aug. 2007, at 53, 55. 
23 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Bagley, No. 10-00244-04-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 
2013); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Lebanon Man Pleads Guilty, Faces 20 
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hinged on the fact that Ed allegedly began a sexual relationship with Nicole 
when she was still sixteen, two years before Missouri’s age of consent and 
four years before the other defendants met the couple.24 
Though a separate charge exists for adults who traffic minors,25 the 
U.S. Attorney ultimately opted not to invoke it in Bagley’s case.26  Taking 
this bizarre charge arrangement—and the even more bizarre asymmetry in 
convictions between Bagley and his co-defendants—as a starting point, this 
Article will advance three main claims, addressed in three separate parts.  
Part II will review the facts in the indictment, underscoring the 
contradictions between the government’s initial charges, the defendants’ 
pleas, and known evidence in the case, suggesting that the law of 
trafficking was used creatively to net defendants who paid for sex.  Part III 
will place Bagley’s conviction within the larger context of legal rhetoric, 
showing how the rhetoric of anti-slavery has consistently been used to 
impose heightened punishment, as evidenced by the White Slave Traffic 
Act, or Mann Act, and trafficking—both of which were charged in the 
case.  Part IV will suggest that invocations of anti-slavery rhetoric bear 
doctrinal implications, reconciling increased federal power with an under-
theorized version of what John Stuart Mill termed the “principle of 
freedom,” which is a basis for state power potentially more expansive and 
complicated than H. L. A. Hart’s emphasis on harm.27 
                                                                                                                          
Years in Prison for Coercing a Minor to Become a Sex Slave (Jan. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/kansascity/press-releases/2013/lebanon-man-pleads-guilty-faces-20-years-in-
prison-for-coercing-a-minor-to-become-a-sex-slave.  
24 MO. REV. STAT. § 567.030 (2012); Plea Agreement, supra note 23, at 2.  Paying for sex 
traditionally constitutes patronizing prostitution, a misdemeanor offense, and no U.S. attorney had ever 
charged a patron of prostitution, or “John,” with conspiracy to traffic an adult.  Press Release, supra 
note 23. 
25 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012). 
26 Plea Agreement, supra note 23, at 1. 
27 MILL, supra note 1, at 101.  Mill uses the terms “freedom principle” and “liberty principle” 
interchangeably.  See John Gray & G.W. Smith, Introduction to J.S. MILL ON LIBERTY: IN FOCUS 
1, 12–13 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991) (explaining the scope of the “liberty of action” 
contemplated by Mill).  Even John Stuart Mill qualified his famous harm principle in cases where 
individuals willingly entered relationships that curtailed their freedom, a point that subsequent theorists 
like H. L. A. Hart have missed.  See H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 42–47 (1963) 
(explaining the difficulty in applying Mill’s principles to the punishment of immoral or indecent 
behavior); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
109, 176–77 (1999) (discussing new applications of the harm principle in the context of Chicago’s 
temperance movement); John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. 
L.J. 1, 14 (2009) (relaying the differences between morality legislation based on harm and that based 
on a “moral majority”); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 132 
(2007) (explaining how proponents of morality legislation bolster their arguments with legitimate 
physical harm arguments).  But see Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1151, 1151–52 (2010) (arguing that the recent interest in the legislation of morality is “greatly 
exaggerated”).  To those who maintain that the principles of harm and liberty merge, this Article 
disagrees, arguing that prevailing notions of the harm principle are overly utilitarian, hopelessly vague, 
and oft-eclipsed by rhetorical bids to rationalize the criminal sanction in the frame of anti-slavery.  
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II.  “EXTREME TYPES OF PLAY” 
If ever a federal indictment aimed to shock the conscience, it was Ed 
Bagley’s.  Issued by a grand jury on March 29, 2011, the document 
claimed that Ed and his wife Marilyn lured a sixteen-year-old girl named 
Nicole, or “FV” (female victim), into their trailer with promises of “a great 
life,” including, but not limited, to making her a “model,” making her a 
“dancer,” and making her “dreams come true.”28  The Bagleys allegedly 
provided FV with a “bedroom, dresser, and television,” along “with clothes 
and food,” all in an effort “to entice her to stay in their trailer home.”29  
From 2002 to 2004, when Nicole turned eighteen, the Bagleys “modeled 
‘slave clothes,’” and “used the internet and adult BDSM pornography to 
train and groom FV to become a sex slave.”30 
Following Nicole’s eighteenth birthday, Ed subjected her to a series of 
“sexual acts” that the government later framed as alternately “mutilation” 
and “torture.”31  These included sessions during which Ed “hooded, roped 
down, and pierced through FV’s nipples with hooks and stretched her 
breasts in the air;” “whipped FV’s body” with “paddles, canes, and 
floggers;” “gagged FV and tied her body and neck up with rope;” and 
“locked, chained and hooded FV naked in a dog cage, often suspending the 
cage in the air or attaching FV’s sex organs to electrical devices while she 
was trapped in the cage.” 32   
According to the indictment, Ed “advertised and publicized” these 
activities “over the internet and in live web cam sessions.”33  One of the 
websites that Ed posted to was alt.com.34  According to Michael Stokes, 
one of Ed’s co-defendants who later pleaded guilty to trafficking, Ed 
streamed so many videos on alt.com that he received a “free ‘gold 
membership.’”35  Ed also staged live “demo” sessions with Nicole, 
accepting cash and other items from men who paid to participate in the 
sessions.36 
Though the government framed Ed’s conduct as trafficking, i.e., the 
use of force, fraud, or coercion to cause an individual to perform a 
commercial sex act, Ed argued that he and Nicole were involved in a 
                                                                                                                          
28 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 8.  
29 Id. 
30 Id.; see also United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d. 289, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (defining 
BDSM as “an alternative sexual lifestyle, known as bondage, dominance/discipline, submission/sadism, 
and masochism”). 
31 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 10. 
32 Id. at 10–12.  
33 Id. at 11–12. 
34 Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Stokes, No. 10-00244-04-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 
2012). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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consensual, Dominant/submissive, or D/s relationship that hinged on 
bondage, domination, and sadomasochism, or BDSM.37  Many of the 
actions alleged in the indictment, Ed argued, boasted identifiable 
corollaries in BDSM culture.38  For example, the use of metal devices to 
pierce parts of the body is a common form of BDSM “play,” as is the use 
of electricity or “electro-torture,” “bondage,” “erotic restraint,” 
“suspension,” and the employment of various devices to whip or flog 
another person.39  For serious BDSM practitioners, these activities assume 
a distinctly “theatrical,” even “artistic” form, often requiring advanced 
planning, preparation, and cooperation between the individual 
administering the treatment, or the “Dominant,” and the individual 
receiving the treatment, or the “submissive.”40 
Rather than convey the planned, theatrical component of BDSM 
practice, the government decontextualized Ed’s actions and portrayed them 
as random acts of sadistic violence.  Meanwhile the government stressed 
the fact that Nicole was Ed’s “slave” as evidenced by the fact that Bagley 
had her “sign a ‘sex slavery contract’” shortly after her eighteenth birthday 
that bound her “legally” to him “with a term that ‘never’ ended.”41  Though 
the contract bore no legal validity, the government framed Ed and Nicole’s 
relationship in terms of modern slavery and trafficking.42 
This warrants some comment.  Recently popularized by romance 
writer E.L. James in her 2012 best-seller Fifty Shades of Grey, the notion 
of a D/s, or “slave,” contract first emerged in a nineteenth century novel by 
German author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.43  Entitled Venus in Furs, the 
novel used the slave contract not to endorse chattel slavery but to 
underscore a larger point about the relationship between intimacy and law, 
arguing that true intimacy need not be rooted in notions of equality and that 
liberal preoccupations with equality actually obviate the possibility of 
achieving “the most intense human passion,” the highest form of love, and 
                                                                                                                          
37 Frankel, supra note 2. 
38 Compare Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 9–12 (outlining the alleged conduct engaged 
in with Nicole), with PHILIP MILLER & MOLLY DEVON, SCREW THE ROSES, SEND ME THE THORNS: 
THE ROMANCE AND SEXUAL SORCERY OF SADOMASOCHISM 2–4 (1995) (discussing conduct and 
practices commonly observed in BDSM relationships and culture). 
39 See generally MILLER & DEVON, supra note 38, at 4–9, 78–79, 81, 95 (providing an overview 
of BDSM tools and techniques used in “play”).  
40 Danielle Lindemann, Will the Real Dominatrix Please Stand Up: Artistic Purity and 
Professionalism in the S&M Dungeon, 25 SOC. F. 588, 593 (2010). 
41 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 9.  
42 See Bill Draper, Edward Bagley, “Master Ed,” Pleads Guilty in Sex Slave Case, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/edward-bagley-sex-slave-
guilty_n_2481981.html (quoting the rhetoric used by the government in the Ed Bagley case).  
43 E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY 165–75 (paperback ed. 2012); LEOPOLD VON SACHER-
MASOCH, VENUS IN FURS 73 (Joachim Neugroschel trans., Penguin Books 2000) (1870).  
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the giving of oneself completely to another.44  In other words, the slave 
contract in von Sacher-Masoch’s novel represented a legitimate, superior 
alternative to both the marriage contract and to Locke’s social contract, 
nothing less than the foundation for “a new social polity.”45  Precisely 
because slave contracts mock both marriage and liberalism—they might be 
viewed as a form of political or perhaps even artistic protest—critiques of 
conventional values that coincide more closely with BDSM “play” than 
with legal definitions of trafficking explain why they are a common trope 
in D/s culture.46  Yet the government once again downplayed the existence 
of such a culture in its indictment of Bagley, de-emphasizing the contextual 
history of slave contracts in order to frame Nicole as a victim of sex 
trafficking. 
Arguably the most culturally freighted piece of evidence to be de-
contextually used against Bagley was a tattoo that Nicole received shortly 
after her eighteenth birthday.  According to Bagley’s indictment, Ed “had 
FV tattooed to mark her as his property,” including “a bar code on FV’s 
neck.”47  Rather than a sign of trafficking, however, the barcode’s origin 
dates to Canadian artist Jana Sterback who used it as a critique of mass 
                                                                                                                          
44 VON SACHER-MASOCH, supra note 43, at 117–19; Nancy Bentley, The Strange Career of Love 
and Slavery: Chesnutt, Engels, Masoch, 17 AM. LITERARY HIST. 460, 476–77 (2005). 
45 Bentley, supra note 44, at 476–77.  Though von Sacher-Masoch’s name would go on to inspire 
the term masochism, nothing suggests that either Ed Bagley or “slave nicole,” as he referred to her on 
D/s blogs and in Taboo magazine, were aware of Venus in Furs.  Yet, the text underscores the point 
that Bagley and Nicole’s relationship may in fact have been consensual, their contract an effort to 
consecrate an intimate bond outside the confines of companionate marriage.  Id.  Indeed, if Bentley’s 
read of von Sacher-Masoch is correct, then the slave contract may—for some—be even more 
“intimate” than the marriage contract.  Further, Nicole signed the contract when she was eighteen.  By 
that age, she was a consenting adult not just in the eyes of Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 566.034 (2012), 
but also from the viewpoint of the federal government, 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012).  See also ASAPH 
GLOSSER ET AL., THE LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS (2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/opa/pdfs/statutory-rape-state-laws.pdf 
(compiling state laws and reporting requirements regarding statutory rape).  A tangential question—not 
addressed by the U.S. Attorney or, arguably, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act—is whether the 
creation of a slave contract per se violates the Thirteenth Amendment.  As President Barack Obama 
stated in a presidential proclamation on December 29, 2011, “President Abraham Lincoln issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation” not simply to end black slavery, but to consecrate the “essential 
principles” of “equality and freedom,” throughout the nation.  Proclamation 8772, 3 C.F.R. 213 (2011).  
We live in a nation where, in the twenty-first century, “[t]he victims of modern slavery have many 
faces.”  Proclamation 8471, 3 C.F.R. 2 (2010).  Hence, perhaps even those who enter willingly into 
master/slave relationships violate the Constitution by effectively seceding from the Union.  Imagine, 
for example, if adherents to the S&M master/slave lifestyle chose not simply to build communities on 
the Internet, but to create actual, physical communities.  Does the invisibility and/or non-
geographicality of Internet communities obscure what would otherwise be roundly condemned under 
the Thirteenth Amendment?   
46 See MILLER & DEVON, supra note 38, at 3 (suggesting that BDSM goes against generally 
accepted social norms about love and sex).   
47 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 9.  
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culture in a 1989 photograph of a faceless prisoner.48  Entitled Generic 
Man, the photo sparked a trend in bar code tattoos in the United States and 
abroad—with celebrities like Pink and Aubrey O’Day acquiring them.49  In 
D/s culture, the barcode tattoo gained salience in 1999 thanks to a novel by 
science fiction writer S.M. Stirling entitled The Domination.50   
An alternate history, The Domination tells the story of a rogue group of 
American colonists who remain loyal to the British following the American 
Revolution, reject the new republic, and move their plantations and slaves 
to Africa.51  Once there, they found a fictional colony called Drakia, which 
tolerates slavery through the twentieth century, ultimately becoming a 
major imperial power that defeats the United States in a global war.52  In 
the book, slaves are acquired through conquest and given barcode numbers 
as part of a larger process of being “groomed” into lives of service.53  The 
book inspired the creation of the Master/slave Registry, an online service 
formed in 2000 that enables Masters to register their slaves by number.54 
Like Venus in Furs, The Domination posits an alternate social polity, a 
world in which society functions more effectively when based on social 
inequality, precisely because such inequality better suits human diversity.  
Much like BDSM “play,” The Domination posits that some are better 
suited by birth to be dominant, others submissive.55  Further, some actively 
                                                                                                                          
48 Tanos, Slave Register Website History, SLAVE REG., http://www.slaveregister.com/about/histor
y (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
49 Id.  Rather than evidence that Ed coerced Nicole into her relationship with him, the tattoo might 
explain why Nicole found the prospect of a relationship with Ed intriguing, possibly thinking it would 
be cultural caché.  In fact, one of Sterback’s other pieces, the meat dress, also gained popular notoriety 
after Lady Gaga donned it at the 2010 MTV Video Music Awards.  Christopher Knight, Lady Gaga, 
Meat Jana Sterbak, L.A. TIMES CULTURE MONSTER (Sept. 13, 2010, 8:45 AM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/culturemonster/2010/09/lady-gaga-meat-dress-recycled.html.  Here, we 
see a blurring of lines between popular culture, counter-culture, and D/s subculture—again explaining 
why a young person might be attracted to its exotic/extreme nature more than its constitutional or 
criminal implications 
50 See S.M. STIRLING, THE DOMINATION 39 (1999) (giving an example of the barcode tattoo). 
51 Id. at 11–12. 
52 Id. at 13–14.  
53 Id. at 22, 35. 
54 See Tanos, supra note 48 (evidencing The Domination’s impact on the Slave Register).  
55 This raises the question whether consensual slavery violates the Thirteenth Amendment.  
International law finds that slavery occurs whenever one party enjoys the exercise of “any or all of the 
powers attach[ed] to the right of ownership” over another.  Slavery Convention, art. 1, para. 1, Sept. 25, 
1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.  “Equally,” notes Dr. Mohamad Mattar, “practices similar to slavery . . . such as 
debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, and sale of children are to be considered slavery-like 
conditions only if they involve ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching the right of ownership are exercised.’”  Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial 
Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 1258 (2011) (quoting Slavery Convention, supra, 60 
L.N.T.S. at 263).  Arguably more inclusive is the Thirteenth Amendment, which according to the 
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nelson is “the denunciation of a condition, and not a 
declaration in favor of a particular people.” 277 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2002).  Additionally, as the 
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seek out submissive roles for reasons that might not be obvious to casual 
observers.  For example, D/s circles registered a remarkable case of 
consensual slavery in 1996 when a twenty-two year old woman named 
Amanda posted a personal ad on alt.personals.bondage.com advertising 
herself for sale.56  According to Amanda, she had auburn hair, was college-
educated, and had been enjoying life “to its fullest” until she realized that 
her parents—who worked for “large acquisition corporations”—made their 
money by taking advantage of “less fortunate people,” foreclosing on 
family-owned businesses to sell their “assets” and “mak[ing] huge 
profits.”57  Claiming a desire to “atone for the sins of [her] family,” 
Amanda offered herself for sale online to the highest bidder “as a sex 
slave” willing to “do and perform any perverse degrading and 
dehumanizing rituals” that her master desired, with the only requirement 
being that her owner “video tape one session a month to be sent to [her] 
parents” so they would know what her life had become.58  Two months 
later, the winner of Amanda’s auction—identified simply as “Master 
Mark”—posted a message to the same blog, noting that “placing a 
monetary value to a slave exchange ensures that the submissive receives 
the best chance of being secured by a dominant who will appreciate, 
respect, and develop the slave’s gift of submission.”59  Here, the transfer of 
money not only added value to the master/slave experience, but guaranteed 
some base-level treatment of the slave, even though the slave herself 
authorized the performance of “perverse degrading and dehumanizing 
rituals” upon her.60 
While Master Ed did not pay money for “slave nicole,” he did 
allegedly accept money from other men for activities involving Nicole.  
For example, four named defendants—Bradley Cook, Dennis Henry, 
James Noel, and Michael Stokes—all provided Ed with cash and other 
items so that they could “engage in sexual acts and torture sessions” with 
FV.61  Ed referred to such transactions as “whoring out” Nicole, a practice 
that enjoys some currency in D/s circles.62  While “whoring out” a 
                                                                                                                          
Ninth Circuit put it in United States v. Mussry, the Thirteenth Amendment applies “to a variety of 
circumstances and conditions . . . [and] to contemporary as well as historic forms of involuntary 
servitude.”  726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).   
56 Baboox, Young Female Slave for Sale, BONDAGE (Dec. 12, 1996, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.alt.personals.bondage.com (password protected website, record on file with author). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Master Mark, Comment to Slaves Selling Themselves, BONDAGE (Feb. 8, 1997, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.alt.personals.bondage.com (password protected website, record on file with author). 
60 Young Female Slave for Sale, supra note 56. 
61 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 7. 
62 See, e.g., Being Pimped/Whored Out, SLAVEFARM.COM (July 7, 2007, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.slavefarm.com/blog/fist-slut/being-pimpedwhored-out (discussing the practice of being 
“whored out”). 
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submissive could theoretically qualify as prostitution, the U.S. Attorney in 
Bagley’s case opted instead to charge all four individuals with conspiracy 
to traffic, an offense to which all four—but not Bagley—later confessed.63 
To be convicted of conspiracy to traffic, the federal government need 
only prove that the defendants agreed to affect interstate commerce by 
causing the victim to “engage in a commercial sex act” either knowing that 
“force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion” were necessary to do so, or 
being “in reckless disregard of the fact.”64  According to the statute, a 
commercial sex act comprises “any sex act on account of which anything 
of value is given to or received by any person.”65  Meanwhile, coercion 
requires “threats of serious harm,” “physical restraint,” or any type of 
scheme or plan “intended to cause a person to believe” that if she does not 
perform an act then she will be subjected to “serious harm” or “physical 
restraint.”66   
While Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes all pleaded guilty to the charge 
of conspiracy,67 questions remain as to why, precisely, Bagley did not.68  
Further, questions remain as to why the government did not pursue Bagley 
on this point, pushing him to trial.  For example, the exchange of cash in 
return for access to Nicole should theoretically have established a 
conspiratorial agreement between Bagley and the others.  Meanwhile, both 
Cook and Stokes gave Bagley money to transport Nicole by car from 
Missouri to California for a pornographic photo shoot, thereby affecting 
interstate commerce.69 
On the topic of the photo shoot, one of the co-defendants charged with 
conspiracy, Henry, also pleaded guilty to violating the Mann Act for 
driving Bagley and Nicole at least part of the way from Missouri to 
California.70  Here again though, questions remain as to why Bagley 
                                                                                                                          
63 Plea Agreement, supra note 34, at 1; Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Cook, No. 10-
00244-02-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2011); Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Henry, No. 10-
00244-03-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2011); Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Noel, No. 10-
00244-05-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2011). 
64 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012); see also id. § 371 (describing the maximum punishment for 
conspiracy). 
65 Id. § 1591(e)(3). 
66 Id. § 1591(e)(2). 
67 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Lebanon Man Pleads Guilty to Sex 
Trafficking, Admits Torturing Woman Who Was Coerced as Sex Slave (Jan. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2012/stokes.ple.html (describing the progression of guilty pleas 
from Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes on their charges of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, 
fraud, or coercion). 
68 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
69 Another possible impact on interstate commerce might have been communications between 
Bagley, Cook, Noel, and Stokes via email, using an instrument of interstate commerce: the Internet.  
70 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. Mo., Former Nevada Postmaster Pleads Guilty 
to Sex Trafficking Conspiracy, Admits Torturing Woman Coerced as Sex Slave (Mar. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/kansascity/press-releases/2011/kc032411.htm. 
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escaped conviction.  After all, the Mann Act requires that the government 
prove a defendant transported a victim across state lines for the purpose of 
an illegal sex act, in this case trafficking.71  Presumably, Henry confessed 
to knowing that Nicole would be trafficked—meaning that she would be 
coerced into performing a commercial sex act.72  However, Bagley refused 
to plead and the government refrained from trying him.73  Why? 
One reason might be that Nicole was never actually coerced.  Shortly 
after returning from California, Nicole declared in an interview with Taboo 
editor Ernest Greene that “Master Ed” was a “great, loving, outgoing guy,” 
and that she had a “fun-loving relationship” with him.74  Noting that the 
couple had come to the magazine’s attention by way of photographer Ken 
Marcus, Greene proceeded to inquire into the details of Ed and Nicole’s 
relationship, including how they met.75  According to Nicole, she “didn’t 
know anything about BDSM” before meeting Bagley, but thought he was 
“good-looking and seemed kind of on the wild side.”76  Bagley, by 
contrast, remembered meeting Nicole through some friends, commenting 
on how she “bounced out of the car, wearing shorts and a skimpy little 
top,” immediately convincing him that “she was the slave girl for me.”77  
Shortly thereafter, Nicole moved in with the Bagleys and, as she told 
Taboo, fell “in love with” Ed and Marilyn and decided to “stay[] with them 
and lov[e] them for the rest of [her] life.”78  Rather than portray herself as a 
victim, in other words, Nicole described her relationship with Ed and 
Marilyn as a voluntary arrangement, on par with a marital relationship—a 
haunting affirmation of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s theory that slavery 
could in fact coincide with love. 
Ed provided further insight into the dynamics of their D/s “play” 
sessions during the Taboo interview.  Rather than aimed at hurting Nicole, 
Ed explained to Taboo that their activities resembled an evolving series of 
theatrical performances, each one more radical than the last, but all 
                                                                                                                          
71 Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012). 
72 Pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, an adult is trafficked if she is made 
to participate in a commercial sex act by “force, fraud, and coercion.”  18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2012).  
If she consensually agrees to a commercial sex act, say sex in exchange for cash, then she is technically 
not trafficked.  While Nicole might be guilty of prostitution, it is actually in her best interest to allege 
that she was trafficked, for then she escapes criminal liability—a point worth noting given that the U.S. 
Attorney identified Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes as “customers” and “Johns.”  Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Three More Defendants Sentenced in Sadomasochistic Sex 
Trafficking Conspiracy (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2013/stok
es.sen.html. 
73 Draper, supra note 42. 
74 Greene, supra note 22, at 53. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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consensual.79  For example, he explained that he “had to learn a lot” in 
order to “keep things fresh” with Nicole, including new “extreme types of 
play” like “catheter insertion, chastity sewing,” and “nailing [Nicole] to a 
board,” all activities later listed in the criminal indictment against him.80  
Nicole spoke articulately about these actions and others, including 
“hanging upside down,” “being hog-tied,” and wearing “hoods for the 
suspense of wondering which whip or what toy [she would] get next,” 
including “gags to bite down when [she felt] the need to cry or scream.”81  
Though some degree of discomfort or pain seemed to be involved in almost 
every action they described, Nicole also confessed that she had a “safe 
word,” but did not like using it unless necessary.82 
One way to explain Nicole’s interview with Taboo is that she enjoyed 
their sessions, loved Ed, and was not trafficked to California.  Another 
possible explanation is that Bagley somehow coerced her into saying the 
things she did.  For example, Nicole might genuinely have been afraid that 
Bagley would hurt her if she did not pretend to condone their relationship, 
deciding instead to mask her fear in statements of enthusiasm.  Of course, 
this begs the larger question: Why, over the course of the seven years that 
Nicole lived with Bagley, did she not try to escape, either by alerting 
neighbors, or physically absconding and contacting police?  Such questions 
lend themselves either to Bagley’s innocence or to the possibility that just 
like many victims of domestic violence, Nicole developed what Dee 
Graham and Del Martin have called “traumatic bonding,” a condition 
where victims of domestic abuse develop an inability to leave or resist.83  
Yet, the state occluded any mention of such conditions, focusing instead on 
evidence suggesting that Bagley engaged in “sexual torture activities” for 
the sole purpose of harming Nicole.84  Even if Bagley was a sadistic 
psychopath, for example, Nicole could not be counted a victim of 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 80 (1976) (“[A] battered woman may spend more energy 
in keeping her secret and trying to salvage some self-respect than in trying to extricate herself from the 
trap.”); Dee L. Graham et al., Survivors of Terror: Battered Women, Hostages and the Stockholm 
Syndrome, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 217, 220–21 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd 
eds., 1988) (defining “[t]raumatic bonding” as “strong emotional ties that develop between two people 
in a relationship where one person intermittently abuses and/or threatens the other” (emphasis 
omitted)); see also Alfred DeMaris & Steven Swinford, Female Victims of Spousal Violence: Factors 
Influencing Their Level of Fearfulness, 45 FAM. REL. 98, 98 (1996) (reiterating the strong emotional 
attachment women may experience with their batterers).  In such situations, individuals in Nicole’s 
position may develop a “learned helplessness” that leads them to view their attacker as invincible and 
themselves as incapable of taking any action against him.  Robert Geffner & Mildred Daley Pagelow, 
Victims of Spouse Abuse, in TREATMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 113, 116 (Robert T. 
Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 1990). 
84 Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 6. 
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trafficking if she consented to their trips, “live webcam shows,” and “play” 
sessions, no matter how shocking they may have been to the uninitiated 
observer.85 
Such observers refused to believe that Ed had trafficked Nicole.  For 
example, Lebanon local Lorrie Bredvick, a waitress at a local restaurant, 
explained to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that Ed and Nicole frequented her 
restaurant often and would always sit at a table in the back corner.86  
According to Bredvick, Nicole was very outgoing and openly spoke about 
her hard-core photo shoots and sexual activities.87  Bredvick said “[t]hey 
no more held that woman captive than a man on the moon,”88 a story 
corroborated by others in the area, including Kelly Myers, a twenty-five 
year old dancer who worked with Nicole at the After Dark Gentlemen’s 
Club near Fort Leonard Wood.89  According to Myers, stripping was 
Nicole’s “passion” and she took it very “[s]eriously.”90  Myers also 
claimed that Nicole had not been taken to California against her will, but 
rather that she “said she had a blast,” raved about “[h]ow nice California 
is,” and encouraged Myers “to go out there.”91 
Witnesses in California confirmed Myers’s version of events; among 
them was Ken Marcus, a longtime photographer for Playboy and 
Penthouse who worked with Nicole in Los Angeles.92  Upon questioning, 
Marcus claimed that he had invited Ed and Nicole to Los Angeles after 
viewing one of their “live webcam shows” on alt.com.93  Marcus then 
conducted a series of shoots with Nicole and Anastasia Price, a 
professional S&M model, “over a period of several days,” selling some of 
the photographs to Taboo magazine—a Larry Flynt publication dedicated 
to BDSM pornography—and reserving others for view on his personal 
site.94  Marcus also conducted an interview with Ed and Nicole during 
which she confessed that she had not been to Los Angeles before but 
“hope[d]” to return.95  As Marcus explained it, Ed and Nicole “seemed to 
be quite a lovely couple,” and Ed appeared to be “going out of his way to 
make sure she was as happy as possible.”96  Shocked to hear that Bagley 
had been arrested for trafficking, Marcus asserted that he witnessed no 
                                                                                                                          
85 Walker, supra note 21. 
86 Frankel, supra note 2.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Walker, supra note 21.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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signs that Nicole was “forced, coerced, or mentally disabled.”97  Instead, he 
claimed that she appeared “bright, intelligent and in control.”98 
While it is certainly possible that Marcus, Myers, and Bredvick all 
misread the nature of Ed and Nicole’s relationship, Nicole herself endorsed 
that relationship during her 2007 Taboo interview, conducted shortly after 
their return from Los Angeles.99  That Nicole might have lied is possible, 
particularly if she suffered from a condition akin to traumatic bonding.  
However, even the successful demonstration of such a condition may not 
have been sufficient to convict Ed of trafficking, particularly if he 
remained oblivious to Nicole’s quiet non-consent.  For example, Ed 
seemed to think that Nicole went willingly to California, minimizing the 
likelihood of proving the requisite mens rea that he either knowingly or 
recklessly coerced her, as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act (“TVPA”).100  Moreover, Bagley posted on SlaveFarm.com that “slave 
nicole loved” the California experience and enjoyed “reading all the 
comments” online about the shoot.101  Though this too might have been a 
subterfuge, the combined effect of his online comments, Nicole’s tabloid 
interview, and eyewitness accounts in both Missouri and California all help 
to explain why the government ultimately discarded Bagley’s trafficking 
charge; a point underscored by his surprisingly mild plea deal.  Though far 
more involved with Nicole than any of the other defendants who did plead 
guilty to conspiracy to traffic, Bagley escaped with a non-trafficking 
related charge: the federal version of statutory rape.102  The convictions of 
Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes, on the other hand, demonstrate how the 
law of trafficking is being used in creative ways, in this case to prosecute 
defendants who paid for what they believed was consensual sex.  How this 
happened, as a rhetorical matter, is the subject of the next Part.  It will 
argue that the government’s case against Ed Bagley points to an under-
theorized rhetorical frame for amplifying the criminal sanction, neither 
                                                                                                                          
97 Id. 
98 Id.  Given that the government’s Mann Act charge hinged on illegal activity in California—
including allegations that Bagley coerced Nicole into the trip—Marcus’s public statements cast Ed’s 
alleged use of coercion into doubt, at least in relation to the California trip.  For example, shortly after 
photographs from Nicole’s shoot were published in Taboo, Bagley himself posted on SlaveFarm.com 
that the trip “made her want to try even harded [sic] to be a good slave girl.”  Master Ed, Comment to 
Hustler Taboo Magazine, SLAVEFARM.COM (June 23, 2007, 6:07 PM), 
www.slavefarm.com/forum/general/general-discussions/hustler-taboo-magazine.  Had Bagley known 
that he was facing a potential Mann Act charge, would he have blogged publicly about the trip?  Or, 
conversely, was the act of blogging about the trip a deliberate effort to mask the fact that Nicole had 
indeed been trafficked?  Ken Marcus would seemingly have answered the second question in the 
negative, as would Kelly Myers, the dancer in Fort Leonard Wood who told the Post-Dispatch that 
upon her return, Nicole claimed that her trip to California had been “a blast.”   Frankel, supra note 2.   
99 Greene, supra note 22, at 53. 
100 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012). 
101 Master Ed, supra note 98. 
102 Plea Agreement, supra note 23, at 1. 
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legal moralism nor harm, but liberty. 
III.  THE RHETORIC OF SLAVERY 
Given the decontextualized nature of the charges against Bagley, 
trafficking appears to be an odd fit in his case.  Yet, it is precisely this ill-fit 
that makes the case curious, raising the question of whether there are 
underlying cultural or rhetorical considerations at work—aspects of 
trafficking that make it an attractive prosecutorial device despite doctrinal 
incongruities.  For example, federal interest in prosecuting Bagley might be 
related to the relatively straightforward question of resources.103  Following 
the federal government’s enactment of the TVPA in 2000, the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance sponsored forty-two Human Trafficking Task Forces in 
the United States, including one in the Western District of Missouri, which 
subsequently received federal grants of nearly one million dollars expressly 
to pursue trafficking cases.104  Flush with federal funds but far from an 
international border or port, U.S. Attorneys in the Western District 
subsequently employed a variety of creative techniques to net trafficking 
convictions.  Some of these techniques included merging the TVPA with 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 
prosecuting traffickers who advertised trafficking victims online, 
prosecuting parents for trafficking their children, and, in the Bagley case, 
prosecuting “customers” or “Johns” who exchanged money for sex under a 
conspiracy theory.105 
This last charge warrants comment.  Even if the Western District’s 
decision to pursue Bagley bore some relation to resources, it still embodied 
a unique rhetorical move, an effort to apply the prevailing frame of 
trafficking to the more traditional trope of prostitution.  For instance, the 
designation of defendants Cook, Noel, and Stokes as “Johns” in the 
indictment clearly evoked the frame of prostitution, suggesting they were 
                                                                                                                          
103 If Nicole had clearly been forced to commit commercial sex acts, either by suffering physical 
detention or threats of deportation, as befalls many undocumented sex workers, then the trafficking 
charge would warrant little comment.  Not so here.  Conflicting witness testimony, counter-cultural 
practices unique to BDSM, and the smorgasbord of resulting convictions invites speculation as to the 
government’s insistence on trafficking.  This furthers the critique that the federal government has failed 
in the war to stop slave trafficking.  KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR: 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA TODAY 248–50 (2009). 
104 Mark J. Kappelhoff, Federal Prosecutions of Human Trafficking Cases: Striking a Blow 
Against Modern Day Slavery, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 9, 17 (2008); Abby Duncan, A Tale of Two 
Districts: Lessons Learned from Missouri’s Human Trafficking Task Forces 1–2 (Jan. 18, 2013) 
(unpublished paper, Saint Louis University School of Law) (on file with author). 
105 Human Trafficking Rescue Project, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., W. DISTRICT MO., 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/programs/humantrafficking.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); see 
Duncan, supra note 104, at 24–26 (describing prosecution tactics in the Bagley case). 
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little more than men who paid Nicole for her sexual services.106  Assuming 
Nicole consented to such activity, the most they could be charged with 
pursuant to Missouri state law would be patronizing prostitution, a 
misdemeanor.107  Under a trafficking framework, however, Cook, Noel, 
and Stokes faced a much greater penalty, upwards of twenty years in 
federal prison.108 
That Stokes and the other “Johns” pleaded guilty to trafficking—but 
Ed Bagley did not—only underscores the creative prosecution of the case.  
It suggests, for example, that the array of charges against Bagley was not in 
fact as noteworthy as the creative application of conspiracy to net 
peripheral actors.  This, in turn, bolsters arguments made by scholars of 
trafficking discourse like Gretchen Soderlund, Karen Terry, and Ric Curtis, 
all of whom contend that the rhetoric of trafficking tends to be invoked in 
cases where it does not actually apply.109  One such expert particularly 
relevant to Bagley’s case is Janie Chuang.110  Beginning in the 1990s, 
argues Chuang, “an unusual alliance of feminists, neo-conservatives, and 
evangelical Christians” pushed for the abolition of prostitution through the 
rubric of trafficking.111  Such “neo-abolitionists” refused to accept that 
women might willingly choose to become prostitutes, arguing instead that 
they suffered from “false consciousness” and were best understood as 
victims of a form of modern slavery that warranted abolition.112  The 
rhetoric of abolition and slavery, in turn, enabled such “neo-abolitionists” 
to stir bipartisan support for aggressive implementation of anti-trafficking 
laws, precisely the kind of aggressive measures that have since come to 
characterize Missouri’s Western District.113     
Though public interest in trafficking has spiked since the 1990s, the 
political salience of anti-slavery rhetoric dates back to the nineteenth 
century.114  As the remainder of this Part shall demonstrate, the rhetoric of 
anti-slavery has long energized anti-prostitution campaigns, beginning as 
                                                                                                                          
106 See MO. REV. STAT. §567.030 (2012) (noting that a person who hires a prostitute commits a 
misdemeanor). 
107 Id. 
108 Bradley Stokes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic and received a twenty-year sentence.  
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Kirkwood Man Pleads Guilty to Sex 
Trafficking (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://justice.gov/usao/mow/news2011/cook.ple.html.  
109 See Soderlund, supra note 10, at 65 (explaining that anti-trafficking movements throughout 
history have drawn on the rhetoric of abolition to underscore the urgency of their cause); see also 
CURTIS ET AL., supra note 16, at 9–10 (explaining that most youth in their survey were not trafficked). 
110 Nicole’s role in the case is markedly different depending on whether she is viewed through the 
lens of trafficking or prostitution.  While Nicole might be guilty of prostitution, she could escape 
criminal liability if she if alleges that she was trafficked.  
111 Chuang, supra note 12, at 1664. 
112 Id. at 1664–66. 
113 Id. at 1659. 
114 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 103, at 6. 
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early as the 1880s.115  Recovering this history is important, if for no other 
reason than to underscore the manner in which anti-slavery rhetoric has 
traditionally operated as a counterpoint to the more staid rhetorical 
conventions of legal moralism and harm.  For example, most criminal law 
scholars generally agree that moralism entered a decline in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, leading to what criminal law theorist Bernard 
Harcourt has termed a “cacophony of competing harm arguments without 
any way to resolve them.”116  The likely outcome of this cacophony, argues 
Harcourt, is that at some point “[a]nother structure will surely emerge,” 
perhaps even increasing our “appreciation that there is harm in most human 
activities.”117 
Even a brief look at the history of legal rhetoric in the criminal law 
context suggests that another structure has emerged—or rather has been 
latent in criminal law rhetoric for over a century.  As early as the 1880s, for 
example, reformers began to invoke the rhetoric of slavery to regulate 
prostitution, culminating in the passage of the White Slave Traffic Act, or 
Mann Act, in 1910.118  Born midst fear that growing numbers of women 
were being lured into prostitution, the Mann Act remains one of the single-
most controversial pieces of legislation in American history.119  Historians 
generally agree that the stated reasons for the law—a fear that single 
women were being kidnapped and exploited as slaves—lacked substantial 
evidentiary basis.120  Instead, the legislation became a rhetorical method for 
advancing a host of ulterior agendas, including immigration control and the 
abolition of prostitution.121  Precisely because it lent itself to such 
politicized uses, the Mann Act might be described as an early sanction 
invoking the rhetoric of slavery to criminalize “illicit” behavior—in short, 
an early version of the same sexual project that is being used to target Ed 
Bagley, who was also charged with violating the Act.122 
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While Harcourt is certainly correct that conservatives endorsed harm 
arguments in the 1990s, a brief look at the climate that produced the Mann 
Act indicates that the current cacophony in criminal law rhetoric is not 
new.  Reformers like Anthony Comstock began to enlist harm arguments in 
the regulation of illicit sex as early as 1872, not long after Mill finished On 
Liberty.123  According to historian Nicola Beisel, the “overwhelming 
majority” of Comstock’s reasons for attacking pornography in the 1870s 
“concern[ed] its effects on children,” including the harm that it caused 
them both morally and physically.124  Among the physical effects that 
Comstock focused on was pornography’s tendency to encourage the “fatal 
habit of masturbation,” a physical and psychological “debility.”125 
Driving Comstock’s invocation of harm was a concern over collapsing 
morals, particularly regarding pornography and prostitution, the latter of 
which was not only tolerated in most cities but also legalized in some, 
including St. Louis in 1870.126  As historian Paul Boyer notes, St. Louis’s 
decision to legalize prostitution set off “alarm bells” in “moral-reform 
circles all over the country.”127  However, such bells did not simply stir 
morality-based arguments; they also roused the rhetoric of harm.  For 
example, nineteenth century reformers argued that prostitution threatened 
not simply moral decline, but also safety, as “debauched husbands” 
brought syphilis home to their unsuspecting wives.128  Consternation over 
prostitution’s role in spreading venereal disease to innocents spawned a 
“social hygiene movement” that then merged with a more moralist “Purity 
Movement” to suppress prostitution completely.129  As historian David 
Langum notes, cities across America suddenly “began to discover they had 
vice problems” and formed vice commissions to investigate segregated red 
light districts, ultimately leading to their abolition.130 
Anti-vice crusades provide convincing evidence of how moral 
arguments and harm arguments merged in the nineteenth century, 
                                                                                                                          
coercion, and that element that cannot be satisfied if the victim acquiesced to the sexual conduct in 
question.  Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2423 (2012); see also Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(3)(A) (2012) (defining coercion as “threats of serious harm to 
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followed a man across state lines, at neither the man’s request nor expense, and then resumed a sexual 
relationship, the Mann Act would not be violated). 
123 See NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY 
REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 76 (1997) (discussing how Comstock linked his anti-vice 
movement to changes in the social order that affected and harmed the foundation of the Victorian 
family).   
124 Id. at 53. 
125 Id. at 54–55. 
126 PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820–1920, at 143 (1978).  
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128 BEISEL, supra note 123, at 22. 
129 LANGUM, supra note 9, at 22–23.   
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engendering a cacophony not entirely unlike that which Harcourt describes 
today.  For example, historian Nicola Beisel notes that “[t]he anti-vice 
crusade[s]” of the nineteenth century “gained legitimacy from the claim 
that children were threatened by the vices reformers sought to suppress.”131  
These included prostitution, pornography, and extra-marital sex—a 
problem facilitated by easily available contraceptives and abortions.132  
Reformers like Anthony Comstock targeted such issues, pushing states to 
criminalize the transfer of obscenity in the mail, the distribution of 
contraceptives, and the performing of abortions—the latter of which “had 
been legal in virtually all of the states until the 1850s.”133  Such issues, 
argues Beisel, including dangers of “pornography” and “the corruption of 
children by libidinous and pervasive popular culture,” prefigured 
“contemporary political concerns.”134 
Animating the rise of harm arguments in the nineteenth century was a 
sense on the part of some reformers that morality alone did not sufficiently 
justify why certain behaviors needed to be controlled.  For example, many 
proponents of the charity organization movement “rejected” the “church-
related approaches” prevalent earlier in the nineteenth century, partly for 
fear that churches might opt not to root out vice so much as to use it as a 
shaming device for boosting church attendance.135  Of particular concern in 
this regard was the Catholic Church, an institution popular among urban 
immigrants yet reviled by Protestant reformers who suspected it of 
tolerating vice as an ineradicable “sin” and therefore an “inevitable” part of 
life.136  Sectarianism, in other words, fueled the turn away from moral 
arguments and toward the harm principle.  
Yet, harm arguments were themselves disputed at the close of the 
nineteenth century.  For example, radical reformers like Victoria Woodhull 
and Tennessee Claflin both argued that behind Comstock’s anti-vice 
crusade lay a more sinister campaign to subordinate women, partly by 
subjecting them to the male-dominated institution of marriage.137  
Proponents of extra-marital sex, or “free love” as it was called at the time, 
joined Woodhull, Claflin, and other radicals like Ezra Heywood, who 
argued for the abolition of marriage on account that it “enslaved” women 
                                                                                                                          
131 BEISEL, supra note 123, at 4. 
132 See id. (discussing how crusades against prostitution, pornography, abortion, and 
contraceptives were strengthened by the claim that these vices harmed children). 
133 Id. at 8–9, 25. 
134 Id. at 4. 
135 BEISEL, supra note 123, at 148–49. 
136 LANGUM, supra note 9, at 210; see also BOYER, supra note 126, at 133 (stating that Protestant 
churchmen saw the decline in urban Protestantism and increase in Roman Catholicism as contributing 
to the moral decline of the city). 
137 BEISEL, supra note 123, at 79–80. 
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and “demeaned” the very notion of love itself.138 
By invoking the trope of slavery, Heywood and others countered 
Comstock’s arguments about immorality—and harm—as it pertained to 
extra-marital sex, effectively subsuming both legal moralism and the harm 
principle within the larger rubric of promoting liberty.139  This emphasis on 
liberty provided just the type of alternate rhetorical structure to the 
morality/harm debate that we see in trafficking today—only it emerged a 
century ago.  As historian Paul Boyer puts it, “In the more lurid rhetorical 
flights of the antivice crusaders, to become a prostitute was to enter a life 
of ‘white slavery.’”140  Meanwhile, “from the perspective of many of the 
women themselves . . . the decision represented a liberating escape from 
bondage,” or matrimony.141 
At a time when African Americans were still considered inferior to 
whites, the invocation of white slavery proved a particularly powerful 
rhetorical trope aimed at mobilizing reform.142  For example, post-bellum 
American labor leaders regularly identified America’s industrial working 
class as white slaves, railing against industrial employers for treating their 
employees like chattel.143  As popular labor leader Eugene Debs put it in 
1897, “the African slave” was a “prince” compared to white “workmen,” 
who were not valued at “15 cents a cord by the slavholders [sic] of 
today.”144 
Just as labor leaders employed the rhetoric of white slavery to sanction 
reform at the turn of the twentieth century, so too did social reformers 
argue that similar dangers threatened white working-class women.145  
Beginning in the 1880s, for example, reformers in Chicago began to fear 
that “shop-girls, cigaretmakers [sic], and sewing girls” risked exploitation 
at the hands of unscrupulous employers who kept wages so low that 
women had no choice but to compromise their virtue to survive.146  Such 
                                                                                                                          
138 Id. at 76, 87. 
139 Id. at 87–88.   
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fears escalated in the 1890s, fueled by sensational stories like H.H. 
Holmes’s serial killing of women in Chicago during the 1893 World’s 
Fair.147  Lurid accounts of immigrant women trafficked into slavery 
followed, further intensifying calls for legal reform.148  By the close of 
1907, Chicago journalist George Kibbe Turner completed his torrid exposé 
of prostitution dens run by depraved men who preyed on hapless, Jewish, 
immigrant women.149  Countless white slavery narratives followed, 
ultimately leading Illinois Congressman James Mann to sponsor the White 
Slave Traffic Act, or Mann Act, in 1910.150 
While scholars of the Mann Act have focused heavily on its race and 
gender implications, few have underscored the law’s significance to the 
legal rhetoric of criminal law, particularly its use of slavery to counter 
and/or accentuate claims rooted in legal moralism and harm.151  For 
example, reformers began to reframe prostitution as white slavery at the 
turn of the century partly to override the question of whether single women 
who engaged in extra-marital sex might have done so willingly, for their 
own pleasure.152  Such “charity girls” suffered criticism for going “out with 
men for an evening of pleasure and drink and intercourse where no money 
[was] asked or offered.”153  
As social conservatives struggled to reign in urban youth, the Mann 
Act became a popular prosecutorial tool—partly because it criminalized 
men who transported women “for immoral purposes,” thereby obviating 
the question of whether those women might have actually wanted to 
travel.154  Further, the law’s invocation of liberty helped it transcend 
fundamental problems with legal moralism, including the question of what, 
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precisely, constituted an immoral purpose.  As legal historian Ariela 
Dubler has demonstrated, the Mann Act did not reflect shared morals so 
much as it provided prosecutors with a tool for delineating what precisely 
constituted “licit and illicit sexual expression.”155  Initially defined as 
anything outside of marriage, prosecutors gradually began to look within 
marriage as well, particularly after prostitutes began to employ the 
“marriage cure” by betrothing their pimps.156  Given natural disagreements 
over morality, the Mann Act benefited substantially from its association 
with anti-slavery rhetoric, which all parties endorsed.  Consequently, 
“[b]etween the end of Prohibition and the mid-1940s,” notes historian 
David Langum, “the Mann Act vied for second place in federal 
convictions,” only “trailing behind interstate transportation of stolen 
vehicles.”157 
Then, abruptly, things changed.  The Act began to lose support in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, partly due to a shift in attitudes toward private 
sexual behavior on the part of American elites, and partly due to evolving 
attitudes about race that made appeals to ending “white slavery” politically 
gauche.158  For example, the Supreme Court indicated as early as 1938 that 
the federal government might be constitutionally authorized to protect civil 
rights abuses against African Americans in southern states.159  President 
Harry Truman redoubled these efforts following World War II, establishing 
a committee to investigate civil rights abuses in 1946.160  Finally, in 1986, 
Congress deleted any mention of whiteness from the law.161 
Though slavery’s color fell from view, support for regulating 
prostitution did not—as evidenced by a spike in concern over trafficking in 
the 1990s.  For example, not long after Congress deleted “White Slave 
Traffic” from the Mann Act, President Clinton outlined a three part 
strategy to address the “prosecution of trafficking, prevention of 
trafficking, and protection of trafficked persons—to guide U.S. anti-
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trafficking initiatives at home and abroad.”162  Clinton’s move followed in 
the steps of an international initiative against trafficking that dated to 1949 
when a host of nations approved the first United Nations Convention for 
the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others—thereby entering a treaty that invoked the rhetoric 
of trafficking to target international and domestic prostitution.163  Article 1 
of the Convention required signatories to “punish any person” who 
“[p]rocures, entices, or leads away,” any woman for “purposes of 
prostitution.”164  The law demonstrated how rationales that had once 
animated the Mann Act survived, this time in the guise of trafficking.165 
Though liberal efforts to deregulate vice in the 1960s and 1970s 
dampened trafficking reform, that interest returned in the 1980s when 
moral conservatives seized on the rhetoric of trafficking to revive interest 
in abolishing prostitution, a move that carried into the 1990s when 
President Clinton led negotiations over a new United Nations Trafficking 
Protocol in 1998.166  That December, the United Nations General 
Assembly passed a resolution establishing an “intergovernmental ad hoc 
committee” to discuss proposals for quelling international “trafficking in 
women and children.”167  Subsequently, the Committee met in Austria in 
1999 to consider draft proposals from member states, including a draft 
protocol to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime that 
included a provision on trafficking.168  One year later, the Committee 
approved a final draft and sent it to the General Assembly for approval.169  
In a symbolic move, the Assembly agreed to meet in Palermo, Sicily—“the 
epicenter of the old Italian Mafia”—to sign the final document.170 
All 117 signatories of the Treaty agreed to make “trafficking in 
persons” a criminal offense.171  To avoid delay, Congress drafted the 
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Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, or TVPA, authorizing 
the federal government to prosecute those who traffic in people for labor or 
sex in violation of the treaty.172  Ironically, even as conservatives derided 
the introduction of foreign law to the United States, few protested 
America’s participation in the U.N. protocol on trafficking.173  In fact, 
political interest in trafficking rose dramatically in the United States, 
leading not only to federal involvement in enforcement but also to 
unprecedented amounts of public and private funds for anti-trafficking 
initiatives, despite questionable evidence that rates of trafficking had 
actually risen.174  
Part of the reason for this surge was the manner in which social 
conservatives found the rhetoric of trafficking and anti-slavery useful for 
regulating prostitution.175  For example, President George W. Bush 
declared in 2002 that trafficking was a “modern day form of slavery” that 
warranted abolition precisely because it was linked to prostitution.176  
“[T]he United States Government,” declared Bush, “opposes prostitution 
and any related activities, including pimping, pandering, or maintaining 
brothels as contributing to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons.”177  
Subsequently, neo-abolitionists attempted to federalize the criminalization 
of prostitution by introducing a bill that would have made any one who 
“persuades, induces, or entices” someone “to engage in prostitution” guilty 
of trafficking.178  Though the bill failed,179 it marked an increasingly 
aggressive effort to enlist the federal government’s anti-trafficking laws in 
the cause of closing the brothels. 
Few venues showcase the rhetorical power of trafficking—and anti-
slavery—better than the Western District of Missouri.  Located far from 
any international border or port, the district still managed to become a 
leader in trafficking prosecutions during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century due to the “innovative techniques” of its prosecutors.180  In 2009, 
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for example, Cynthia Cordes became the first federal prosecutor to 
“successfully prosecute customers of the sex trade under anti-sex-
trafficking laws” by setting up elaborate stings.181  One year later, the 
office became the first in the nation to charge men who paid for sex, 
namely Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes, as conspirators in trafficking.182  
Their subsequent conviction183 underscores the successful manner in which 
the rhetoric of trafficking—and slavery—enabled federal authorities to 
expand the criminal sanction. 
Though long criticized for undermining morals and causing harm, 
prostitution has also been heavily associated with the rhetoric of slavery, as 
this Part has shown.  Importantly, this rhetoric is best viewed as separate 
from either legal moralism or harm—a rhetorical slogan that has been 
invoked precisely because it transcends questions of morality and damage.  
As we have seen, anti-prostitution activists in the nineteenth century settled 
on the notion of white slavery in order to rise above a cacophony of 
arguments rooted in utilitarian and moralist theories surrounding sex work.  
The utility of this rhetoric continued quietly through the twentieth century, 
exploding in the 1990s when anti-prostitution activists, or neo-
abolitionists, turned to the rhetoric of trafficking as a means of stirring 
bipartisan support for intensifying the regulation of prostitution.184 
The next Part will look more closely at the rhetoric of anti-slavery, 
entertaining the possibility that in addition to being a discursive device, it 
might also lead to a substantive principle upon which the penal sanction 
might rest—independent of moralism or harm.  The articulation of such a 
principle raises a variety of questions, including the possibility that 
H. L. A. Hart interpreted J.S. Mill strategically, intentionally truncating his 
theory of liberty to lessen the criminal sanction.  Support for such a 
position can be found, as we shall see, by comparing Hart’s principle to 
Mill’s own discussions of freedom and, even more importantly, slavery.  
But first, a few words on the relationship between legal moralism, harm, 
and Bagley’s case. 
IV.  THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM 
According to most criminal law scholars, debates over punishing 
certain types of conduct have tended to focus on claims rooted in either 
morality or harm.185  While claims rooted in morality tend to be considered 
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“old-fashioned,” claims rooted in harm have “turned out to have little 
practical bite,”186 leading scholars like Bernard Harcourt to conclude that a 
new rhetorical “structure will surely emerge.”187  While the last Part 
posited that such a structure involves the rhetoric of slavery and freedom, 
more than simple rhetoric might be at work.  As this Part will demonstrate, 
J.S. Mill articulated an over-arching theory of liberty, or freedom, that bore 
mixed implications for the criminal sanction,188 at times justifying a greater 
role for punishment than mid-century liberals like H. L. A. Hart 
acknowledged.189 
To illustrate, consider BDSM.  According to most accounts, Americans 
are increasingly indifferent to the bedroom exploits of private couples, 
even couples like Ed and Nicole who engage in extreme forms of BDSM 
play.190  This is perhaps more true now than ever before due to the 
overwhelming popularity of E.L. James’s 2012 novel Fifty Shades of Grey, 
a best-selling romance that describes a relationship akin to the one shared 
by Ed and Nicole.191  Boasting more than ten million copies sold in its first 
six weeks on American shelves,192 the book recounts the story of a twenty-
two year old protagonist named Anastasia Steele who is asked by an older 
man, Christian Grey, to enter into a written contract substantially 
restricting her freedom, including her ability to speak about their 
relationship as well as her conduct within the relationship—which involves 
BDSM play.193 
To legal theorist Katie Roiphe, the popularity of Fifty Shades of Grey 
reflects a larger “cultural interest” in “sexual domination,” reflected not 
just in James’s novel, but also in films like A Dangerous Method about the 
early relationship between Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, as well as studies 
in Psychology Today and findings reported in popular journalist Daniel 
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190 See Julie Bosman, 10 Million Shades of Green for an Erotic Trilogy, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 
2012, at C3 (using the success of E.L. James’s trilogy as evidence that people are indifferent to 
“BDSM”); Nicole Sperling, COMIC-CON; E.L. James Feels the Love from ‘Grey’ Fans; One Credits 
the Author’s Work with Helping Her Get Pregnant. Another Says It’s Made His Love Life ‘Awesome,’ 
L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at D1 (describing how Fifty Shade of Grey transformed the sex lives of two 
couples).  
191 Sperling, supra note 190. 
192 Bosman, supra note 190.   
193 JAMES, supra note 43.   
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Bergner’s 2009 New York Times article “What Do Women Want?”194  
Roiphe argues that such sources suggest, in part, that precisely because 
American women are “less dependent or subjugated” than ever before, 
“theatrical fantasies of sexual surrender” have become objects of casual 
interest, akin to a “vacation” or “an escape from the dreariness” of daily 
life.195 
That average Americans might view BDSM practice as a “vacation,” 
could explain why the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Missouri 
ultimately decided not to pursue a trafficking charge against Ed Bagley, a 
real-life version of Christian Grey.  Such a position would actually 
coincide with prevailing constitutional frames regarding private sexual 
activity.  As recently as 2003, for example, the Supreme Court declared 
that the Constitution did not brook the regulation of consensual sexual 
behavior between adults simply for moral reasons, thereby delivering what 
legal theorist Bernard Harcourt has termed a “coup de grâce to legal 
moralism.”196  The case, Lawrence v. Texas,197 invalidated a sodomy law 
that had been invoked against a same-sex couple in Houston, marking a 
dramatic deregulation of same-sex relationships, not to mention all manner 
of other relationships that local majorities might term illicit.198 To those 
                                                                                                                          
194 Katie Roiphe, She Works Crazy Hours. She Takes Care of the Kids. She Earns More Money.  
She Manages Her Team. At the End of the Day, She Wants to be . . .  Spanked?: Katie Roiphe on the 
Curious Case of the Modern Woman’s Retro Bedroom Fantasy, NEWSWEEK, April 30, 2012, at 24.  
Not all reaction to the book was positive.  Libraries in places as disparate as Maryland, Florida, 
Georgia, and Wisconsin refused to carry the book, while evangelical critics voiced their opposition to 
moral themes in the work, calling it “an unrealistic portrayal of physical intimacy,” and “a setup for 
destruction.”  SELENA SARNS, 50 SHADES OF BLACK AND WHITE: A BIBLICAL RESPONSE TO 50 SHADES 
OF GREY 22, 37 (2012); see also Adelle M. Banks, Tied Up in Knots: ‘50 Shades’ Making It Even 
Tougher for Evangelicals to Address the Touchy Topic of Sex, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), Dec. 8, 
2012, at 20 (“[F]antasizing about individuals other than one’s open spouse (fictional characters 
included), serves no healthy or holy purpose.”); Megan Gloss, Too Hot to Handle? DUBUQUE 
TELEGRAPH HERALD, June 3, 2012, at A46 (describing the battle between the book’s popularity and 
fights to pull it from the shelves); Michael S. Rosenwald, Controversy over “50 Shades of Grey,” 
WASH. POST, June 5, 2012, at B02 (narrating the censorship controversy in Harford County); Pastor Jay 
Dennis, Your Marriage: Black, White and Grey Shades, FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH MALL (Aug. 19, 
2012), http://www.churchatthemall.com/sermon/your-marriage-black-white-and-grey-shades/ 
(addressing the dangerousness of the book and why women should not read it); Kasey Harris, 50 
Shades of Grey—Should We Read It?, CHANGING FACE CHRISTIANITY (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.changingthefaceofchristianity.com/popculturechristianity/50-shades-of-grey-should-we-
read-it-part-1-of-2/ (explaining the concept of the “pop-culture book”). 
195 Roiphe, supra note 194, at 26–27.   
196 Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the 
Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers. [Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex 
Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503 (2004). 
197 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
198 See Dubler, supra note 121, at 807 (“In protecting the rights of individuals to engage in same-
sex sex, Lawrence definitely unmakes the isomorphism between nonmarriage-illicit sex and marriage-
licit sex.”); see also Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. 
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morally-minded majorities, the Court sent a clear message, noting “the fact 
that the governing majority in a state has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral, is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”199  This, the Court maintained, was particularly 
true in cases where the sexual behavior in question was practiced between 
consenting adults in the privacy of their own home.200 
Though focused on same-sex relationships, Lawrence carried with it 
broader implications for those involved in other “illicit” behaviors, like 
BDSM.201  For example, many state sodomy laws prohibited anal and oral 
sex between opposite-sex partners, both commonly incorporated into 
BDSM play.202  Lawrence’s declaration that such activities enjoyed 
protection under the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment 
transported a considerable amount of historically illicit behavior across 
what legal historian, Ariela Dubler, has termed the “illicit/licit divide,” 
making it impossible to regulate couples like Ed and Nicole on strictly 
moral grounds.203  While Dubler focuses on the relationship between the 
illicit/licit divide and marriage—highlighting the fact that the Supreme 
Court has yet to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples—her point 
underscores the larger fact that what is and is not illicit remains culturally 
contingent.  While some believe that the decriminalization of gay sex 
paved the way for the legalization of gay marriage, others disagree, arguing 
instead that the Supreme Court decriminalized gay sex precisely to prevent 
the legalization of gay marriage.204  Justice Antonin Scalia articulated the 
latter view in his Lawrence dissent, framing the struggle over the illicit/licit 
divide in terms not of constitutional interpretation but cultural war.205  “It is 
clear from this [decision] that the Court has taken sides in the culture war,” 
                                                                                                                          
REV. 75, 86 n.46 (registering surprise that Scalia did not mention S/M as one of the “parades of 
horribles” that Lawrence might have deregulated).  
199 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
200 Id. at 571. 
201 Professor Mary Anne Case argues that Lawrence did more than simply deregulate same-sex 
relationships.  See Case, supra note 198, at 78 (clarifying that Lawrence did not target anal sex in 
particular).  For an analysis of “illicit” versus “licit” categories, see Dubler, supra note 121.  
202 The Supreme Court upheld one such law in 1986, over a decade before Lawrence.  See 
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy regardless of sexual 
orientation to be constitutional).  To the extent that BDSM practice might include oral or anal sex, such 
activities would fall under traditional sodomy statutes.  Other BDSM practices, however, remain 
unregulated.  See Mary Anne Case, Commentary, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A 
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1684 
(1993) (suggesting that some BDSM conduct is not generally criminalized by sodomy statutes due to 
the legislature’s inability to imagine such conduct).  
203 See Dubler, supra note 121, at 812 (claiming Lawrence moved sexual behavior across the 
illicit/licit divide without regard to the marital status of the couple).  
204 E.g., Dubler, supra note 121, at 809–10.  
205 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).    
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lamented Scalia, “departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, 
that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.”206  Though vague 
on how precisely the Court might remain a “neutral observer” in liberty 
interest cases, Scalia’s dissent highlights the oft-obscured fact that the 
illicit/licit divide is itself a political battle line—a contested front in what 
Bernard Harcourt has termed “a war of sexual projects that is being fought 
on American soil.”207 
Ed and Nicole’s place in those projects is worth contemplating, if for 
no other reason than to better discern how, precisely, the rhetoric of anti-
slavery might have served either as a separate or over-arching legal 
principle sanctioning convictions in the case.  For example, just as there are 
problems with the notion of rooting BDSM prosecutions in notions of 
morality, so too are there problems with framing cases like Ed and Nicole’s 
in terms of harm.208  After all, the very premise of BDSM culture is the 
notion that the application of pain can yield heightened levels of 
pleasure.209  Hence, the government’s effort to frame Ed and Nicole’s 
BDSM play as torture and abuse fails to capture the cultural context, and 
subjective appeal, of such behavior.210  Further, the government’s decision 
to convict Bagley of sleeping with, but not trafficking, Nicole points to 
doubts it may itself have had regarding its evidence.211  While some might 
contend that Bagley’s years of grooming and his assiduous attention to age 
limits and consent agreements amounted to a subtle, gradual process of 
coercion—not to mention popular perceptions of BDSM as a type of 
“vacation”—it may have dissuaded the government from taking his case to 
trial.212  Ironically, this might explain why defendants who only played a 
marginal role in the case confessed more easily to trafficking than Ed: they 
were less cognizant of the full scope and complexity of the law of 
                                                                                                                          
206 Id. at 602.    
207 Harcourt, supra note 196, at 506.  
208 Here too, Lawrence might pose problems.  While it is certainly possible that the U.S. Attorney 
felt that Bagley harmed Nicole, Lawrence acts like a defensive bulwark in this particular sexual project, 
discouraging efforts to invoke harm as a justification for regulating consensual BDSM practice.  
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602–04.  
209 MILLER & DEVON, supra note 38, at 4, 9–11 (explaining that in BDSM culture, receiving pain 
in the context of domination, bondage, corporal punishment, and flagellation between consenting adults 
elicits pleasure and eroticism).  
210 Of course, the government may have felt that Nicole never consented to her relationship with 
Bagley, particularly given the young age at which she began to be groomed.  Yet, the U.S. Attorney 
never charged Bagley with trafficking a minor, even though he did end up pleading guilty to using the 
Internet to facilitate sex with a minor.  Put differently, the possibility that Bagley might have trafficked 
Nicole by taking advantage of her young age is a possibility that not even the government was willing 
to accept.   
211 Pursuant to the TVPA, coercion need only be proven when the victim is over eighteen.  18 
U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).  
212 Bagley’s slave contract might have been an effort to record Nicole’s consent to their BDSM 
activities.  
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trafficking, not to mention the counter-cultural norms of BDSM. 
Lawrence might also have played a role.  Since Lawrence, mutually 
consensual sexual behavior between adults has enjoyed constitutional 
protection—even if it causes alleged harm.  For example, the Court in 
Lawrence ignored claims that sodomy threatened the spread of sexually 
transmitted disease, holding instead that the Fourteenth Amendment 
broadly protected private consensual behavior.213  Hence, harm proved 
relatively useless as a rhetorical tool—ditto for moralism.214  To 
compensate for this, the Supreme Court focused heavily on consent in 
Lawrence, arguably using it as a substitute for arbitrary measurements of 
damage.215 
With consent comes freedom.216  Given the challenges that BDSM 
practice poses to questions of harm, it remains possible that trafficking 
provided the government with an opportunity to seize on the currency of 
liberty as a frame for prosecuting a variety of players in a complex, morally 
obtuse drama.  As we have seen, trafficking offers rhetorical possibilities 
that other criminal penalties do not, possibilities that may even render it a 
powerful weapon against the Supreme Court’s firewall surrounding 
intimate conduct in Lawrence.  Even as Lawrence hinges on the arguably 
popular notion that the Constitution protects a liberty interest in private 
sexual conduct,217 trafficking bounds that conduct by invoking the specter 
of coercion.  Closely tied to coercion, of course, is the rhetoric of slavery, 
anti-slavery, and freedom, all cultural frames that engender considerable 
popular support, marshal considerable regulatory potential, and seem to fit 
nicely with Bagley’s case.218 
While Ed can claim that Nicole engaged willingly in her own 
enslavement, jurors might find it repugnant that he asked her to sign a 
formal slave contract, a violation of the spirit of liberty more profound than 
either legal moralism or harm.  Indeed, the idea that one might sign away 
one’s freedom seems to defy the very purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, an amendment forged in the aftermath of a bloody civil war 
                                                                                                                          
213 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (majority opinion). 
214 See Harcourt, supra note 27, at 192–93 (asserting that there was “a certain disequilibrium in 
the relative rhetorical force of the competing arguments”). 
215 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  
216 MILL, supra note 1, at 101. 
217 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569.  
218 See Mayer N. Zald, Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND 
CULTURAL FRAMINGS 261, 261 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996) (recognizing the recent focus on 
“strategic framing of injustice and grievances, their causes, motivations, and associated templates for 
collective action”).  See generally BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 103 (discussing modern slavery, 
including human trafficking); David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, 
and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464 (1986) (discussing cultural frameworks touching 
on the topic of slavery).  
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dedicated to eradicating human bondage.219  Further, the notion that one 
might surrender one’s liberty also falls askance of the political theory 
espoused by John Stuart Mill.220 
In the same essay that he articulated his famous harm principle, Mill 
also warned that one should not be able to “sell himself, or allow himself to 
be sold, as a slave,” arguing that it violates the “principle of freedom.”221  
This principle, argued Mill, overrides personal choice.  Even if one finds it 
desirable to be a slave, the state should not allow individuals to sacrifice 
their freedom, because “[t]he principle of freedom cannot require that [one] 
should be free not to be free.”222  Granted, Nicole’s slave contract bore no 
legal validity.  However, the argument could be made that as a matter of 
principle, efforts to recreate chattel slavery through D/s practice 
approaches something like a common law marriage, an informal 
relationship in which individuals hold themselves out to be married—or in 
this case enslaved—thereby defying the principle of freedom. 
To criminal law scholar Joel Feinberg, Mill’s “principle of freedom” is 
simply another facet of the harm principle, an appeal “not to a sovereign 
right to ‘dispose of one’s own lot in life’ but to a person’s own good.”223  
Yet, this might be an incomplete inflation of harm’s importance within 
Mill’s larger theory of freedom or liberty.  For example, legal scholar 
Vincent Blasi demonstrates that Mill granted “extraordinary protection” to 
the freedom of expression, even in cases where “severe harms” were at 
stake.224  This move stemmed from a larger conviction that questions of 
“utility” should remain subordinate to the development of individuals as 
“progressive being[s],” even if it meant opposing custom, conformity, and 
religion.225  One of Mill’s problems with “Calvinistic theory,” for example, 
was that it placed “obedience” above freedom.226  Rather than encourage 
obedience, Mill believed that law should foster “the cultivation of 
individuality.”227  “[I]t is only the cultivation of individuality,” argued Mill, 
                                                                                                                          
219 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 62 (1998).  
220 See MILL, supra note 1, at 101 (denouncing the idea that a person has a right to sell themselves 
into slavery). 
221 Id. 
222 Id.  
223 FEINBERG, supra note 185, at 75.  The loss of one’s freedom essentially constitutes an “evil” 
and falls easily “among many [other] types of harm.”  Id. at 75–76.  
224 Vincent Blasi, Shouting “Fire!” in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 
535, 540 (2011).  
225 See id. at 541 (“Those permanent interests related to progress depend, Mill firmly believes, on 
widespread free thought and on the presence throughout the society of persons with the strength of 
character to be bold in their inquires, unshackled by custom and convention.”).  
226 MILL, supra note 1, at 59.  
227 Id. at 60–61.  
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“which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings.”228 
Mill’s doubts about religion and his interest in developing individuality 
are worth noting, precisely because they point to a rationale for legal 
intervention in private matters otherwise downplayed by criminal law 
scholars.229  In his famous “pared down” version of Mill’s theory, for 
example, H. L. A. Hart deliberately occluded any mention of the 
development of individuality, focusing instead on a “simple and succinct 
statement” about harm, noting that “[t]he only purpose for which power 
can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community 
against his will is to prevent harm to others.”230  This move, argues Bernard 
Harcourt, “structured the debate over the legal enforcement of morality” 
for the remainder of the twentieth century, pitting legal moralism against 
harm.231 
That Hart deliberately truncated Mill is not something criminal law 
scholars have considered, though its implications are potentially profound.  
For example, Mill enumerated a variety of scenarios where power could be 
“rightfully” “exercised” over individuals “against [their] will” that 
arguably did not involve preventing harm.232  For example, he sanctioned 
the use of unfettered power against “children,” “young persons,” and 
anyone who was too “backward” to be improved by “free and equal 
discussion.”233  Mill also declared it a “self-evident axiom” that the state 
should “compel” parents to educate their children “up to a certain 
standard.”234  If they failed, he maintained, they should be punished; 
subjected to “a moderate fine” determined by whether or not their children 
passed “public examinations.”235   
Mill’s support for punishing parents who did not adequately educate 
their children stemmed not simply from his conviction that the law should 
prevent harm, but a larger conviction that the law should be used to 
engender a particular type of person: a creative, free-thinking individual, or 
what Mill termed a “genius.”236  While Mill recognized that not all persons 
could achieve genius status, he placed the cultivation of such figures at a 
premium, arguably even above the interests of majoritarian democracy.237 
“Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a 
                                                                                                                          
228 Id. at 61. 
229 For a more in-depth discussion of Mill’s theory of development, see Russell Hittinger, The 
Hart-Devlin Debate Revisited, 35 AM. J. JURIS. 47 (1990).  
230 HART, supra note 27, at 4 (quoting MILL, supra note 1, at 9) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Harcourt, supra note 27, at 122–23, 129 (noting that Hart “pared down” Mill’s thesis).  
231 Harcourt, supra note 27, at 122–23.  
232 MILL, supra note 1, at 9–10.  
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 104. 
235 Id. at 105. 
236 Id. at 62. 
237 Id. at 62–63. 
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reproach,” argued Mill, “it is desirable, in order to break through that 
tyranny” that government should foster individuality, “eccentricity,” and 
“genius.”238  The way to do this, argued Mill, was to guarantee a certain 
degree of personal freedom, for “[g]enius can only breathe freely in an 
atmosphere of freedom.”239   
Yet, that freedom was itself bounded by the larger goal of developing 
individuality, not conformity.  Even if the majority of people longed for 
“the despotism of custom,” or the “mediocrity” of religion, argued Mill, 
society’s proper posture, according to him, was the encouragement of 
unique, creative individuals with exemplary talents—even if it meant 
forcing parents to educate their children in a certain way.240  “I insist thus 
emphatically on the importance of genius,” noted Mill, continuing that 
“[t]he initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from 
individuals; generally at first from some one individual.”241 
Because he prized individual genius above community norms, Mill 
endorsed a variety of regulations that may or may not have had anything to 
do with harm.  This explains why he called for mandatory education and 
for penalties against parents who did not sufficiently train their children.242  
It also explains why he refused to extend legal protection to entire 
populations of what he termed “backward” people and “barbarians” who 
could not be improved by “free and equal discussion.”243  Such measures, 
argued Mill, made the development of genius among a select few more 
likely, even if it left groups considered “backward” unprotected.244 
Committed to fostering personal creativity, Mill endorsed state 
measures that intruded more heavily into private life than criminal law 
theorists like H. L. A. Hart have let on.  Indeed, Mill himself never actually 
invoked the term “harm principle,” referring instead to the “principle of 
freedom” or “liberty” as his animating principle of regulation.245  
Acknowledging this is important.  While the invocation of harm lends itself 
to diminishing the criminal sanction, to dismantling legal moralism, and so 
on, the celebration of individuality, eccentricity, and “genius” invites a 
more ambiguous regulatory agenda, one that H. L. A. Hart chose not to 
expound.246  In fact, one might say that the principle of freedom introduces 
a new basis for justifying and expanding the criminal sanction.247 
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To take just a few examples, the principle of freedom might be invoked 
as a rationale for those who try to recreate chattel slavery, not just 
individuals like Ed Bagley but those who participate in even more 
elaborate D/s practices, like paying money for slaves—such as Master 
Mark.248  The freedom principle might also be invoked to criminalize the 
distribution—but not necessarily the possession—of certain drugs on the 
theory that those who knowingly profit from addiction are responsible for 
spreading a form of slavery, or un-freedom.249  As Mill himself noted, the 
“interest” of “dealers in promoting intemperance” rather than just imbibers 
“is a real evil and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring 
guarantees which, but for that justification, would be infringements of 
legitimate liberty.”250  Further, the freedom principle might be invoked to 
regulate purveyors of other types of vice, like prostitution, a point that Mill 
raised by acknowledging that while fornication “must be tolerated” the 
same did not necessarily apply to whether “a person [should] be free to be 
a pimp.”251 
Political philosophers have proven more open to exploring the 
implications of Mill’s concept of freedom than criminal law theorists.  
Compare, for example, H. L. A. Hart’s exclusive emphasis on harm to 
Gerald Dworkin’s argument that Mill envisioned the use of state power “to 
heighten a person’s ability to lead a rationally ordered life,” a point that 
coincides with the development of individuality, creativity, and genius.252  
In a manner that suggests the plausible existence of a distinct principle of 
freedom, Dworkin also endorsed the idea that Mill would have sanctioned 
government intervention in private life out of “a concern not just for the 
happiness or welfare, in some broad sense, of the individual but rather a 
concern for the autonomy and freedom of the person.”253  Though criminal 
law scholars like Joel Feinberg have tended to resist such “freedom 
maximization” arguments by attempting to roll them into calculations of 
harm,254 even Feinberg concedes that freedom and harm do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                          
would be slaves, and thereby limiting a slave’s ability to contract, protects and does not interfere with 
the slave’s liberty). 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 56–60 (describing a situation in which the “master” of a 
sex slave was paid by others so that they might “engage in sexual acts and torture sessions” with the 
sex slave).  
249 MILL, supra note 1, at 99.  
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 98.  But see Jeremy Waldron, Mill on Liberty and on the Contagious Diseases Acts, in 
J.S. MILL’S POLITICAL THOUGHT: A BICENTENNIAL REASSESSMENT 11, 18 (Nadia Urbinati & Alex 
Zakaras eds., 2007) (commenting that Mill was not always clear about social interference).  
252 HART, supra note 27, at 30; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 184 
(Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1975).  But see Richard J. Arneson, Mill Versus Paternalism, 90 
ETHICS 470, 470 (1980) (analyzing the conclusions of various authors on the subject of paternalism). 
253 Dworkin, supra note 252, at 174, 184.   
254 FEINBERG, supra note 185, at 76. 
 598 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:561 
coincide, noting that one might have “a powerful psychological” 
imperative to willingly impose harm upon oneself, either out of “atonement 
for some sin,” “the achievement of perfect self-discipline through a kind of 
self-abasement,” or “a religious need to achieve genuine humility through 
the lowliest status he can acquire.”255 “Voluntary enslavement for some of 
these reasons,” continues Feinberg, “seems no crazier than the solitary 
forms of holy asceticism, like choosing the life of an anchorite in the 
desert, wearing sackcloth and ashes, and mortifying the flesh.”256 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The prosecution of Ed Bagley and four other defendants in rural 
Missouri for sex slavery points to new, even strange directions for the law 
of trafficking.257  To begin, Bagley’s D/s relationship, with FV/Nicole 
complicated the case precisely because it hinged on acts unique to BDSM 
subculture.  However, the government deliberately decontextualized such 
acts in its indictment, arguably misrepresenting Ed’s treatment of Nicole as 
a matter of simple abuse.  Further, the government decontextualized Ed 
and Nicole’s “slave contract,” using it to reinforce its claim of trafficking, 
along with Nicole’s barcode tattoo. 
While the government could have argued that a subtle form of coercion 
underlay Ed’s activities, the Western District of Missouri pursued a 
different path, accepting a non-trafficking related plea from Ed.258  
Meanwhile the government convicted the remaining defendants of 
conspiracy to traffic—an odd asymmetry given that they had much less 
contact with Nicole.259  Part I concludes that the government’s case against 
Ed ultimately proved less important than its pursuit of marginal defendants 
who paid for sex with Nicole, pointing to a new role for the law of 
trafficking—the regulation of men who pay for sex. 
Part II expands on the relationship between trafficking and prostitution 
to make a larger point, namely that trafficking invites creative use precisely 
because it provides prosecutors with a more salient justification for 
punishment than either legal moralism or harm; a rhetorical plea to anti-
slavery that enjoys a longstanding but under-theorized role in criminal law 
rhetoric.  According to criminal law scholar Bernard Harcourt, criminal 
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law rhetoric is rooted in a fairly straightforward dichotomy between 
morality and harm.260  While most criminal law theorists agree with this 
postulate,261 Bagley’s case indicates that a third trope is also operative: 
freedom. 
Part III demonstrates that freedom/anti-slavery rhetoric has long played 
a role in American criminal law, dating at least as far back as the Mann Act 
of 1910.  Initially styled the White Slave Traffic Act, the law emerged 
during a time in American history when reformers sought desperately to 
control prostitution, immigration, and eroding rural values.  When it came 
to such projects, neither appeals to morality nor harm proved as salient as 
invocations of slavery, pointing to a longstanding, if lost, pillar of legal 
rhetoric, a counter to legal moralism and harm rooted in Mill’s notion of 
liberty.  Recovering the rhetorical role of freedom in the criminal law 
context is the most significant contribution of this piece. 
Part IV engages the doctrinal implications of freedom as a principle, 
asking whether anti-slavery’s recurrence in criminal law discourse might 
be more than simply rhetorical; a possible free-standing principle upon 
which to rest criminal punishment—one deliberately submerged by 
H. L. A. Hart in the 1960s.  While most criminal law scholars merge Mill’s 
thoughts on freedom and liberty with his mention of harm, Mill himself 
espoused an interest in using state power to encourage creativity, 
individuality, and “genius,” all regulatory agendas potentially more 
complicated than H. L. A. Hart’s “pared” down emphasis on damage.262  
Perhaps no better example of this exists than Mill’s own assertion that 
selling oneself into slavery violates the “principle of freedom.”263  Even 
criminal law scholars like Joel Feinberg concede that regulating such 
choices might actually have little to do with the analytics of harm.264  Even 
if H. L. A. Hart is not wrong on Mill, he encouraged an overly narrow 
interpretation of his work. 
  
                                                                                                                          
260 See generally Harcourt, supra note 27 (explaining various contexts in which morality and harm 
intersect). 
261 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 185, at 136–37 (discussing different views of morality in 
criminal law rhetoric); KADISH ET AL., supra note 185, at 143 (labeling John Stuart Mill’s “harm 
principle” as the “prevailing principle” of arguments rooted in harm); KAPLAN, supra note 185, at 146–
47 (establishing John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” as the origin of arguments rooted in harm in 
criminal law rhetoric). 
262 See also Hittinger, supra note 229, at 51 (discussing how Mill sets out his harm principle at the 
very beginning of On Liberty, how Hart and Devlin criticize each other for interpreting Mill 
“tendentiously,” and how they are both correct because “Hart and Devlin take [Mill’s] rule and move 
immediately to the problem of applications, which Mill himself reserves for the final chapter of his 
book.”). 
263 MILL, supra note 1, at 101.  
264 FEINBERG, supra note 185, at 76.  
